W e present a game-theoretic model to explore how uncertainty about terrorist preferences can affect optimal resource allocations for infrastructure protection. We consider a dynamic game with incomplete information, in which the defender chooses how to allocate her defensive resources, and then an attacker chooses which target to attack according to a multiattribute utility function. Our model constructs a prior distribution representing both defender uncertainty about the attacker weights on the various attributes in the attacker utility function and also defender ignorance about unobserved attributes that may be important to the attacker but have not been identified by the defender. The incorporation of unobserved attributes is a novel feature of our model and allows every target to have a positive prior probability of being attacked when the defender is sufficiently uncertain about the attacker preferences. In a dynamic environment, the defender then has an opportunity to jointly update her knowledge about both the attribute weights and unobserved attributes in a Bayesian manner, based on actual (or attempted) attacks observed in a previous period of the game. In general, defender uncertainty has a greater impact on defensive resource allocations in our model than in much of the previous work.
Introduction
Learning about terrorist goals and motivations can help defenders protect the most attractive targets and avoid wasted effort. In fact, that is one of the primary reasons for gathering intelligence about potential attackers in the first place. "Intelligence and warnings" have been identified as one of six critical mission areas in the first National Strategy for Homeland Security (U.S. Department of Homeland Security 2002). Recently, there has also been emerging interest in the interface between intelligence analysis and risk analysis (e.g., Willis 2007 , Bracken et al. 2008 , Baker et al. 2009 ). This paper explores how best to represent defender uncertainty about terrorist preferences, considering attacker adaptability, multiattribute attacker objectives, and the possibility of defender learning.
Because of the strategic nature of terrorist threats, numerous researchers have used game theory to study resource-allocation decisions for protecting potential targets against terrorism; see, for example, the reviews by Sandler and Siqueira (2009) and Guikema (2009) . Using the assumption of rationality, game theory focuses on the relationship between terrorists and defenders, with both being assumed to make optimal choices based on their available resources and knowledge. Generally, a sequential game with two players (a defender and an attacker) is considered. A typical model assumes that the defender moves first to allocate her defensive resources among potential targets; then the attacker observes the allocation and chooses an attack action (e.g., Brown et al. 2006 , Powell 2007a . Although some models allow continuous choices for both players (e.g., Major 2002 , Siqueira and Sandler 2006 , Zhuang and Bier 2007 , Sandler and Sigueira (2009) note that the number of continuous variables is generally limited. Therefore, to emphasize the defender side of the resource-allocation problem, researchers often assume continuous defender decisions but discrete attacker choices (e.g., Bier et al. 2007 Bier et al. , 2008 .
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Much past work is based on games of complete information, in which the payoff functions of the participants are fully known to each other. However, Bier (2007, p. 607) points out that uncertainty about terrorist goals and values "plays an important role in contemporary discussions of terrorism, and hence is important to capture in a model of the optimal defensive allocation." The importance of uncertainty about terrorist characteristics for resource-allocation decisions is also discussed by Farrow (2008) . Early explorations of game-theoretic models with incomplete information focused on the defender's uncertainty about attacker capacities (e.g., the total resources available to the attacker). For example, Lapan and Sandler (1993) modeled the defender's subjective assessment of the attacker capacity by a continuous probability distribution; by contrast, Brown et al. (2006) conducted a worst-case scenario analysis over all possible values of the attacker capacity. Later researchers have extended interest to defender uncertainty about attacker preferences among potential targets. For example, Bier et al. (2007) represented such uncertainty through probability distributions representing the defender's beliefs about attacker target valuations; in this model, the probability of an attack on a given target can be determined endogenously, in light of any defensive investments.
Some researchers have also studied the effects of attacker uncertainty. For example, Powell (2007b) allowed defenders to have private information about the vulnerability of potential targets, whereas the attacker observed only a probability distribution for the vulnerability of each target. Zhuang et al. (2010) assumed discrete defender types that are not fully known to the attacker, and allowed the defender to implement deceptive signals to mislead the attacker.
Most of the above models do not explicitly explore how the defender's optimal resource allocations vary in the face of her uncertainty levels. However, some exploratory efforts have been made in this regard. For example, Bier et al. (2008) assumed that attacker target valuations follow a Rayleigh distribution, and took the coefficient of variation as a measure of defender uncertainty. Similarly, Jenelius et al. (2010) assumed that the defender's assessment of attacker target valuations is subject to errors that follow a Gumbel distribution. Interestingly, the results of Jenelius et al. (2010) show a significant impact of uncertainty on the optimal resource allocations, whereas the results in Bier et al. (2008) show little impact of uncertainty. However, the results by Bier et al. (2008) do indicate that different measures of target attractiveness can yield significantly different optimal budget allocations, suggesting that a single univariate measure of attractiveness may be inadequate to capture the full effects of defender uncertainty. To explore the impact of defender uncertainty about terrorist preferences on defensive resource-allocation decisions, more realistic multiattribute terrorist objective functions may therefore be preferable, such as those developed by Beitel et al. (2004) and Rosoff and John (2009) .
Uncertainty also evolves over time, and Bayesian methods can capture such changes. For example, Lapan and Sandler (1993) allow the defender to update her knowledge about the attacker capability in a Bayesian manner by observing the attacker's historical actions; Sticha et al. (2005) and Jha (2009) use dynamic Bayesian networks to update defender beliefs about the attacker's propensity to attack. In contrast, Zhuang et al. (2010) model two types of attacker learning, in which the attacker can observe both the defender's "signal" and the actual results of past attacks in a dynamic environment.
In this paper, we consider a dynamic game with incomplete information, in which the defender first chooses how to allocate her defensive resources, and then an attacker chooses which target to attack according to his target preferences represented by a multiattribute utility function. Inspired by Jenelius et al. (2010) , we incorporate unobserved attributes (which may be important to the attacker but have not been identified by the defender) into the attacker's multiattribute utility function. The defender's uncertainty about attacker preferences is then modeled by a subjective distribution representing both defender uncertainty about the attacker weights on the various known attributes and also defender ignorance about any unobserved attributes. Our model allows the defender and attacker to have different objectives, as opposed to a zero-sum game where they have opposed objectives. Moreover, we allow the defender to update her knowledge about attacker preferences in a Bayesian manner, based on actual (or attempted) attacks observed in a previous period of the game. INFORMS holds copyright to this article and distributed this copy as a courtesy to the author(s).
Additional information, including rights and permission policies, is available at http://journals.informs.org/.
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Decision Analysis 8(4), pp. 286-302, © 2011 INFORMS We believe that our model allows for a more realistic representation of defender uncertainty about attacker preferences than previous work using univariate attacker utility functions without unobserved attributes (e.g., Bier et al. 2007 Bier et al. , 2008 . As such, it could pave the way for the use of game-theoretic methods (which have historically been viewed as "not yet ready for prime time") in supporting real resourceallocation decisions.
Model

Basic Model
Our basic model is a two-period dynamic (repeated) game with incomplete information, where each period is a sequential game in which the defender plays first. The first period of the game looks like the one-period game proposed in Bier et al. (2007) , with some minor modifications. Nature first draws a type for the attacker from a prior distribution f . The attacker observes this type, but the defender knows only the distribution f . In the first period, the defender decides on how to allocate her defensive resources among a heterogeneous collection of potential targets, where c 1 f represents the first-period allocation chosen in the face of the distribution f . The attacker then observes the defensive allocation, chooses whether to attack, and, if making an attack, chooses an attack target; a 1 c 1 represents the attacker decision and target choice (if any). An attack may turn out to be either a success or a failure. In the second period, the defender observes the target of any (successful or failed) attack, updates the prior distribution f over attacker types to obtain a posterior distribution f a 1 , and makes a new resourceallocation decision based on that distribution. The defender's new allocation is c 2 [f a 1 ], to which the attacker responds with a new attack decision and target choice a 2 c 2 . See Figure 1 for the corresponding game tree.
Knowing or assuming that the attacker would play his best response to any given defensive allocation, the defender would wish to choose her allocation to effectively protect against attacks, deter attacks, or deflect attacks to less important targets. However, with uncertainty about the attacker's utility function, the defender cannot predict the attacker's best response for sure; therefore, the defender is assumed to minimize her total expected disutility. In principle, a traditional game-theoretic model would consider the long-term total expected utility/disutility for both periods; i.e., the defender and attacker would choose their first-period actions taking into account their second-period payoffs. However, in this paper, we assume a myopic attacker and defender for reasons of simplicity. This assumption could also be realistic if the attacker and defender change from one period to the next (e.g., because of turnover in the leadership of attacker groups and election of a new administration in the defender country).
In the first period, the (myopic) defender's objective is to minimize the total expected disutility from an attack, taking into account the threat (quantified by the probabilities of attacks on the various targets), the vulnerability (quantified by the success probabilities of those attacks, as a function of the allocation of defensive resources), and the consequences (quantified by the defender's valuations of the targets). The defender's optimization problem is thus given by
where n = number of targets, c i = defender's resource allocation to target i, c = c 1 c n = defender's resource allocations to the n targets, B = defender's total budget, v i = defender's valuation of target i, p c i = success probability of an attack on target i as a function of the budget allocated to target i, h i c = probability of an attack on target i, L c = total expected disutility to the defender. INFORMS holds copyright to this article and distributed this copy as a courtesy to the author(s).
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As in Bier et al. (2008) , we assume that the success probability of an attack on target i is an exponential function of the defender's investment in that target, p c i = e − c i , where is the cost effectiveness of defensive investment. For example, at = 0 02, if the c i are measured in millions of dollars, then every million dollars of defensive investment will reduce the success probability of an attack by about 2%. For convenience, we introduce a target 0 to represent "no attack," in which case the defender suffers no loss, v 0 = 0, and the attacker gains only a reserve utility of u 0 . For example, u 0 could represent the cost of an attack (which would be saved by the attacker if no attack is launched). In this model, h 0 c represents the probability that no attack will happen. Moreover, we assume that the defender never allocates resources to target 0; i.e., c 0 = 0. Therefore, p c 0 = 1, ensuring that if the attacker launches no attack, he will obtain the reserve utility u 0 for sure.
The attacker is assumed to observe the defender's resource allocation c and then choose a target to attack according to a multiattribute utility function with three attributes, of which attributes 1 and 2 are assumed to be observable by the defender (although of course more attributes could be considered). We assume that the attacker's utility is linear in each of the various attacker attributes. We also assume additive independence among the attributes. The attacker's decision is then to choose an attack target to maximize his utility function: i = utility of the unobserved attribute for target i; x = x 1 x 2 x 3 , attacker weights on the three attributes, where x j ≥ 0 for j = 1 2 3, and 3 j=1 x j = 1; I i = 1 if target i is attacked and 0 otherwise. The A ij represent the attacker's single-attribute utilities (not the actual attribute values) over the two attributes that are known to the defender. In addition, inspired by Jenelius et al. (2010) , we introduce the error terms i to represent the effects of any additional attributes that are unobserved by the defender but may nonetheless be important to the attacker. For convenience, we also define = 1 n as a vector representing the utilities of the unobserved attributes for the n targets. In this paper, the i for each target are modeled as random variables taking on values in [0 1]. Therefore, the attacker utility u i for target i will be between 0 and 1 for all i. Note that 0 is a constant, not a random variable, and A 0j = 0 = u 0 is the attacker's reserve utility.
Defender Uncertainty About
Attacker Preferences To specify the defender's uncertainty about attacker target valuations, we represent the attacker's type by the attribute weights x and unobserved attributes , and allow them to be uncertain (as they will be to the defender). Assuming that the attribute weights x and the i are independent of each other, the joint distribution of the x j and i for a given attacker type is given by
where g x 1 x 2 x 3 is the joint probability density function (PDF) for the attribute weights x, and q i i is the PDF for the utility of the unobserved attribute i for target i. In this model, we assume that the attribute weights x follow the Dirichlet distribution as given by
where z = 0 t z−1 e −t dt j > 0 for j = 1 2 3; 0 = 3 j=1 j ; x j ≥ 0 for j = 1 2 3; and x 3 = 1 − 2 j=1 x j . In this case, the means and variances of the x j are given by E x j = j / 0 and Var x j = j 0 − j / 2 0 1 + 0 , respectively, and the covariances are given by Cov x j x j = − j j / 2 0 1 + 0 . INFORMS holds copyright to this article and distributed this copy as a courtesy to the author(s).
Additional information, including rights and permission policies, is available at http://journals.informs.org/. The Dirichlet distribution has the desired property of ensuring that the weights sum to one. Moreover, changing the value of the parameter 0 in the Dirichlet distribution while holding the expected values of the attribute weights constant enables us to vary the extent of the defender's uncertainty by changing a single parameter, with larger values of 0 corresponding to smaller levels of uncertainty.
Assuming that the defender has no prior knowledge of the unobserved attributes, we model the utilities of the unobserved attributes i for each target as independent, identically beta distributed random variables in the first-period game; i.e.,
where 1 > 0 and 2 > 0. To show the effect of the unobserved attributes explicitly, let be the contribution of the unobserved attributes to the average overall variance of attacker target utilities (as a multiple of the average variance due solely to the known attributes), as given by
Var u i i = E i Specifically, the average overall variance of attacker target utilities, 1/n n i=1 Var u i , is equal to (1 + ) times the average variance due solely to the known attributes, 1/n n i=1 Var u i i = E i . (Note that must be nonnegative, with larger values of corresponding to higher defender uncertainty, i.e., more impact of the unobserved attributes.)
Because the attribute weights x and the i are independent, the numerator of the above expression can be expanded and simplified as follows: 
Thus, the multiplier can be expressed in the form
(1) To ensure that the average expected attacker utility of each target remains the same with or without the unobserved attributes, we also choose
for all i = 1 n. Note that the i are identically and independently beta distributed, with mean INFORMS holds copyright to this article and distributed this copy as a courtesy to the author(s).
Additional information, including rights and permission policies, is available at http://journals.informs.org/. (1) and (2), we get
Thus, we can solve for the parameters 1 and 2 describing the distribution of the attacker's unobserved attributes to match any desired level of uncertainty. Note also that varying the sum 1 + 2 while keeping the ratio 1 / 1 + 2 unchanged will allow us to change the extent of defender uncertainty about the unobserved attributes without affecting the average expected attacker utility. We show results for different values of the multiplier in §3.
The First-Period Game
Based on the defender's prior distribution as described above, we can assess the defender's subjective probability of an attack on a given target in the firstperiod game. Assuming that both the defender and attacker are solving myopic (one-period) optimization problems, the probability that target i will be attacked in the first period is given by N . Similarly, the probability that no target will be attacked in the first period is given by
For illustrative purposes, we first consider a twotarget case for simplicity and derive the following analytic results; see Appendix A for the derivation of attack probabilities for the two-target case, and Appendix B for proofs of propositions. More complex numerical results are presented in §3.
Proposition 1. The probability of an attack on any given target in either period of the game is nonincreasing in the level of defensive resources allocated to it, if expenditures on other targets are kept unchanged.
In other words, the more the defender invests in protecting a target, the less attractive it is to the attacker, and the less likely it is to be attacked.
Proposition 2. If the defender has a sufficiently large budget, she can ensure that any target she chooses has a probability arbitrarily close to one of being attacked in the first-period game by defending the other targets.
Thus, for example, with an adequate budget, the defender can effectively deter attacks against the more valuable targets by deflecting attacks to the least valuable target. Moreover, the above proposition also implies that if the budget is large enough, the defender can render attacks arbitrarily unlikely by deflecting the attacker to target 0 (no attack).
Proposition 3. When the probability distributions of the weight x 3 and the utilities i for the unobserved attributes put nonzero mass on every value in [0, 1], then all targets will have nonzero attack probabilities. Moreover, this will remain true after any finite defensive investment.
This suggests that the model with unobserved attributes may perform well in the event of "surprise" (e.g., an attack on a target that would appear to be of low attractiveness based on the known attributes). In contrast, a model without unobserved attributes could fail in the event of an attack on an unattractive target, especially one that was previously predicted to have a zero probability of being attacked.
Unfortunately, determining the optimal allocations in the first-period game analytically is difficult. However, we illustrate the impact of defender uncertainty on the nature of the optimal defensive resource allocation by two examples. Later, we present a third example to illustrate the impact of defender uncertainty on the optimal defender expected disutility. (Note that the derivations in Example 1 assume that the attacker attribute weights follow a normalized Weibull distribution rather than a Dirichlet distribution, because the normalized Weibull distribution has a closed-form cumulative probability function; see Appendix C. However, we believe that the nature of the results is likely to hold more generally.) Example 1. Consider a simple two-target, twoattribute case without unobserved attributes. For simplicity, we set u 0 = 0. We assume that target 1 is more valuable to the defender (v 1 > v 2 ), and target 1 scores INFORMS holds copyright to this article and distributed this copy as a courtesy to the author(s).
higher on the first attacker attribute A 11 > A 21 but lower on the second attacker attribute A 12 < A 22 . For simplicity, we assume that A 11 = A 22 = v 1 and A 12 = A 21 = v 2 . Consider the case where target 2 is expected to be substantially more attractive to the attacker; in particular, we assume that the expected weight on the first attacker attribute is less than e − B A 22 − A 12 / A 11 − A 12 + e − B A 22 − A 21 , so that even when spending the entire budget on target 2, the defender still expects target 2 to be more attractive than target 1 to the attacker. In addition, we assume that the total budget B is less than 1/ ln v 1 − ln v 2 , so that spending the entire budget on target 1 will still leave an attack on target 1 more damaging to the defender than an attack on target 2 e − B v 1 > v 2 . 1 In this case, the optimal allocation to target 1 will increase as the level of defender uncertainty about attacker preferences increases. When the defender is quite certain that target 2 is more attractive to the attacker, she will spend more on target 2, but as she becomes more uncertain about the attacker preferences, she will begin to invest more in target 1, which is the more valuable target to her.
Example 2. Consider a simple two-target, twoattribute case with one known attribute and one unobserved attribute. For simplicity, we set the reserve utility to u 0 = 0 and the defender valuation of target 1 to v 1 = 1. Suppose also that target 1 is more attractive to the attacker on the known attribute (A 11 > A 21 ); specifically, we assume that A 11 = 1 and A 21 = 0. Moreover, let the weight x 1 for the known attribute and the utilities of the unobserved attributes Defender valuation of target 2 Optimal allocation to target 2 (%)
50%
As we might expect, the optimal allocation to target 2 is increasing in the defender valuation v 2 . Furthermore, although target 2 is not attractive at all to the attacker on the known attribute, the optimal defensive resource allocation to this target can still be moderately high (even above 50%) if the target is sufficiently important to the defender, because of "hedging" in the face of uncertainty about the unobserved attribute.
With perfect information about attacker preferences, the defender will allocate her resources to equalize the attacker utilities among all defended targets, because otherwise, any defensive resources spent protecting a less attractive target will be wasted. In that case, the optimal allocations depend only on the attacker valuations. However, the examples above show that when the defender is uncertain about the attacker preferences, the optimal allocations depend not only on the attacker's (expected) utilities, but also on the defender's own target valuations. Moreover, Example 2 suggests that with unobserved attributes, even a target that is believed to be of little value to the attacker may still receive significant investment, to protect against the possibility that this target may be attractive to the attacker on some unobserved attribute(s).
The impact of defender uncertainty about attacker preferences on her equilibrium (optimal) expected disutility is complicated. On the one hand, high levels INFORMS holds copyright to this article and distributed this copy as a courtesy to the author(s).
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of uncertainty create the likelihood that some defensive resources will be wasted protecting targets that are not highly attractive to the attacker. On the other hand, high levels of certainty may not be beneficial, if the defender expects that the attacker will choose a target that is of high value to her. We illustrate the impact of defender uncertainty on the optimal defender expected disutility in the following example.
Example 3. Consider a case similar to Example 2, with target 1 being more attractive to the attacker on the known attribute (A 11 = 1 and A 21 = 0), except that we let the weight on the known attribute (x 1 ) be a constant instead of a random variable. The more weight we put on the known attribute, the more certain the defender is about the attacker preference for target 1 over target 2. Figure 3 shows the relationship between the defender's optimal expected disutility and her certainty level about the attacker preferences (represented by the weight x 1 on the known attribute) for different combinations of the defender's target valuations v 1 v 2 .
As mentioned above, two factors affect the defender's optimal expected disutility as the level of defender certainty about attacker preferences increases: one is the reduced potential for wasting resources by protecting the wrong targets and the other is whether the more attractive target to the attacker is also more valuable to the defender. When target 1 is less valuable to the defender than target 2 (v 1 ≤ v 2 , above the diagonal dashed line), the defender's optimal expected disutility will be nonincreasing as the defender becomes more confident that target 1 is attractive to the attacker, because this is the less valuable target to the defender, and the higher level of certainty allows the defender to concentrate her defensive resources on the attacker's preferred target. By contrast, when the defender values target 1 more than target 2 (v 1 > v 2 , below the diagonal), these factors work in opposite directions. Higher certainty still allows the defender to concentrate her defensive resources, but now also increases the chance of an attack on the more damaging target. Depending on how much target 1 is preferred by the defender when v 1 > v 2 , the defender's optimal expected disutility can be nonincreasing in her certainty level, nonmonotonically related to her level of certainty, or increasing 
Increasing certainty leads to increasing disutility Increasing certainty leads to nonincreasing disutility Increasing certainty has a nonmonotonic effect on disutility s in her certainty level (when the ratio of v 1 to v 2 is sufficiently large).
Bayesian Updating
In the second period, assuming that an attack (or attempted attack) on target i has occurred in the first period, the defender can update her knowledge about the attacker attribute weights and the utilities of the unobserved attributes for each target through Bayesian updating. For resource allocations c 1 in the first period and c 2 in the second period, the probability that target i will be attacked in the second period if target k was attacked in the first period is given by
where l k c x } is the likelihood that an attack on target k will occur given the values of x , and c. Note that for specific values of x , and c, this likelihood will generally be either 0 or 1, which makes the posterior distribution of the attacker attribute weights INFORMS holds copyright to this article and distributed this copy as a courtesy to the author(s).
and unobserved attributes a truncated version of the prior distribution, excluding all values that are inconsistent with the observed attacker choice in the firstperiod game. Note that the attribute weights x and the utilities of the unobserved attributes are updated jointly. Moreover, after the update, the probability distributions for the unobserved attributes i will generally no longer be either identical or independent. In §3, we present sample applications illustrating the effects of Bayesian updating on the defender's knowledge about attacker preferences.
Sample Application
We now apply our model to sample data for three urban areas: New York City (NYC), the Boston area (including parts of New Hampshire), and Houston. Those cities are all among the urban areas in the United States with the highest expected damage from terrorism, according to Willis et al. (2005) . In this section, we assume that the defender valuations of these cities are given by the expected property losses from Willis et al. (2005) .
We consider two known attacker attributes (as in Bier et al. 2008) : airport departures and average daily bridge traffic. We assume that the defender knows the values of those attributes (as shown in Table 1 ) but is uncertain about how much weight the attacker puts on each one. Table 1 In particular, we conduct two-way comparisons involving two city pairs: NYC-Houston and BostonHouston. In the first pair, NYC is overwhelmingly more attractive to the attacker, because it scores better on both attributes. The two cities in the second pair are roughly comparable in attractiveness, with Boston scoring higher on average daily bridge traffic, whereas Houston scores higher on airport departures. Effects of unobserved attributes other than air departures and bridge traffic are also considered. For example, if the attacker cares about damaging the oil industry, Houston could be a more attractive target than New York City. We assume that the attribute weights follow the Dirichlet distribution with parameters 1 2 , and 3 , where 1 and 2 correspond to the attacker weights on air departures (A i1 ) and bridge traffic (A i2 ), respectively, and 3 reflects the weight of any unobserved attacker attributes ( i . We set 1 / 2 = 4, which means the defender believes that the weight on airports is four times as large as the weight on bridges for the attacker. We assume that the utilities of the unobserved attribute i for the two targets are independent and identically distributed and have a prior beta distribution ( 1 2 in the first-period game.
We also vary the contribution of the unobserved attributes to the overall defender uncertainty, through our choice of distribution parameters as described in §2.2. We consider three cases (low, medium, and high impact of unobserved attributes), corresponding to = 0 2 (implying that the unobserved attributes have an effect similar to that of the less weighted observed attribute), = 1 (in which the unobserved attributes contribute half of the overall defender uncertainty), and = 9 (in which the unobserved attributes contribute 90% of the overall defender uncertainty). We also consider two levels of total budget: a high value of $100 million (close to the UASI investment in New York City in 2009) and a low value of $10 million (which is less than the UASI allocation to any of the three cities in 2009). The cost effectiveness of defensive investments is assumed to be = 0 02 throughout this section.
We model the problem of defensive resource allocations between two targets as a stochastic global optimization problem on a bounded onedimensional variable (i.e., the level of resources allocated to the first target). We adopt the nestedpartition method (Shi and Ólafsson 2000) to solve the resulting optimization problem. We have also used the nested-partition method to efficiently solve two-dimensional (three-target) and three-dimensional INFORMS holds copyright to this article and distributed this copy as a courtesy to the author(s).
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(four-target) problems. However, more powerful computational tools are needed to deal with larger numbers of targets. Figure 4 shows the impact of defender uncertainty about both the attribute weights and the unobserved attributes on the optimal resource allocations in the first-period game. Moreover, Figure 5 shows the optimal probabilities of an attack on Houston in the firstperiod game, to aid in understanding and interpreting the optimal resource allocations presented in Figure 4 . equally attractive to the attacker, then the attacker would presumably choose randomly which of the two to attack. However, because the defender cares much more about New York than about Houston, the defender would rather sacrifice Houston than New York, and so would prefer to invest sufficiently in New York City to make it less attractive than Houston. How much less attractive the defender wants New York City to be will depend on two factors:
The First-Period Game
(1) how uncertain the defender is about the attacker's asset valuations (with high uncertainty leading the defender to spend even more on New York, to make sure that it becomes less attractive than Houston) and (2) how much more valuable NYC is to the defender (with large differences in valuations again leading the defender to spend more on New York). With a small budget, the defender invests almost INFORMS holds copyright to this article and distributed this copy as a courtesy to the author(s). Additional information, including rights and permission policies, is available at http://journals.informs.org/. exclusively in the protection of New York rather than Houston, because even when all the money is spent on New York (Figure 4(a) ), New York will still be quite attractive to the attacker (with an attack probability of roughly 0.3 at low levels of defender certainty, as shown in Figure 5 (a)) because of the defender's budget limitations. In contrast, in the highbudget case, only approximately 60% of the total $100 million is allocated to New York City at optimality ( Figure 4(b) ), which is adequate to make New York City highly unlikely to be attacked in the first-period game (as shown in Figure 5(b) ). We now consider the city pair of Boston versus Houston (see Figures 4(c) and (d) and 5(c) and (d) ). The optimal allocation to Houston in the first-period game is increasing in the level of defender certainty about the attribute weights (Figure 4(c) and (d) ). The effect of uncertainty on the defender's optimal resource allocations is more pronounced in the lowbudget case (Figure 4(c) ) than the high-budget case (Figure 4(d) ). Specifically, consider the low-budget case where the defender puts moderate emphasis on the unobserved attributes (i.e., = 1 in Figures 4(c) and 5(c)). Here, Boston is assumed to be more valuable to the defender, whereas Houston is believed to be more attractive to the attacker based on the known attribute values and the expected attribute weights. At high levels of certainty about the attribute weights (corresponding to high values of 0 , the defender is confident that Boston is relatively unlikely to be attacked even without any defensive investment. Thus, spending only about 20% of her total INFORMS holds copyright to this article and distributed this copy as a courtesy to the author(s).
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budget on Boston will be adequate to make Boston quite secure (with a less than 10% chance of being attacked), so the rest of the budget can be allocated to Houston to reduce the disutility from the more likely prospect of an attack on Houston. By contrast, at low levels of certainty about the attribute weights (corresponding to low values of 0 , the defender is less confident about which target will be attacked, and therefore needs to invest sufficient resources (nearly 60% of the defensive investment) in protecting Boston to ensure that it still has a low probability of being attacked. Now consider the effect of the unobserved attributes on the optimal defensive allocations. When the defender believes that unobserved attributes (other than airports and bridges) are highly weighted by the attacker (e.g., = 9), she cannot reliably predict which target will be more attractive to the attacker. In that situation, her own valuations of the targets play an influential role in her optimal decision, especially when the defensive budget is low. For example, consider the city pair Boston versus Houston for the case of a small budget (as shown in Figure 4(c) ). Because Boston is more valuable to the defender, Boston receives significantly more defensive resources at optimality when = 9 than when = 0 2.
We now explore how the defender's expected disutility depends on her uncertainty about the attacker's preferences. Figure 6 represents the impact of defender uncertainty on the defender's optimal expected disutility (in terms of expected property losses, in millions of dollars) for Boston versus Houston in the first-period game; results for NYC versus Houston are similar. Not surprisingly, high budgets lead to lower expected losses. Moreover, in this particular case, because Boston and Houston are comparably attractive to the attacker in terms of the two known attributes, as the defender becomes more confident about her prior estimates (corresponding to larger values of 0 and lower values of ), she can expect to lose less at optimality, because the added certainty reduces the need to defend both targets.
The Second-Period Game
Our model allows the defender to update her prior knowledge in a Bayesian manner by observing the attacker's choice in the first-period game. In Figure 7 , we show the effects of Bayesian updating for Boston versus Houston in the second-period game, if an actual or attempted attack is observed by the defender in the first-period game. Results are shown for = 0 2 and = 9. Note, as stated previously, the attribute weights (x) and the utilities of the unobserved attributes ( ) are updated jointly. First consider the case where Houston was attacked in the first-period game (see lines of diamonds in Figure 7 ). Because Houston is assumed to be less valuable to the defender, it was optimally left to be attacked with high probability in the first period (as shown in Figure 5 (c) and (d)). Therefore, observing an attack on Houston does not provide much new knowledge about attacker preferences and hardly changes the optimal resource allocation. Conversely, INFORMS holds copyright to this article and distributed this copy as a courtesy to the author(s).
Additional information, including rights and permission policies, is available at http://journals.informs.org/. an attack on Boston (see lines of solid dots in Figure 7) would represent a surprise, because Boston was previously believed to be sufficiently well protected to be of little interest to the attacker. Therefore, such an attack leads to a significant change between the defender's prior and posterior resource allocations, with less resources being allocated to Houston in the second-period game. Furthermore, defender updating regarding attacker preferences leads to more dramatic changes in the second-period optimal resource allocations when the defender is initially less sure about the attacker's attribute weights (i.e., for lower levels of 0 . Also, higher uncertainty about the unobserved attributes ( = 9; Figure 7 (c) and (d)) leads to greater changes in the optimal defensive resource allocations through Bayesian updating than lower uncertainty ( = 0 2; Figure 7 (a) and (b)). As we can expect, these effects are much more pronounced with a small budget (Figure 7(a) and (c)) than a large budget (Figure 7 
Conclusions and Directions for Future Research
By using multiattribute terrorist utility functions (rather than the kinds of single-attribute objective functions that have been used in most past work (e.g., "maximize fatalities" or "maximize economic losses"), we were able to achieve a more realistic representation of defender uncertainty about attacker preferences. Our dynamic model also allows the INFORMS holds copyright to this article and distributed this copy as a courtesy to the author(s).
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defender to update her knowledge in a Bayesian manner by observing a previous (actual or attempted) attack. The magnitude of the defender's budget has a significant effect on her optimal defensive resource allocation. When the budget is sufficiently large, the defender can effectively deter attacks against the targets that are most valuable to her, and the resulting optimal allocations are not highly sensitive to the levels of defender uncertainty. However, with scarce resources, it becomes impossible for the defender to adequately protect the targets that are most valuable to her in the face of significant uncertainty about which targets are likely to be attacked.
One potentially worthwhile extension to this paper would be to consider nonmyopic players who care about long-term payoffs, rather than just the immediate payoff in the current period of the game. For example, a nonmyopic attacker may want to attack a less attractive target in the first stage of the game, to mislead the defender about his real preferences. Because such deception may cause the defender not to protect the targets of greatest interest to the attacker, the attacker may benefit from sending such a "deceptive signal" (Zhuang et al. 2010) . Similarly, a nonmyopic defender may choose resource-allocation decisions in the first period that increase her ability to observe the attacker's preferences, if the cost of deceiving the attacker is not catastrophic. Moreover, in conditions of high uncertainty about terrorist preferences, the defender may want to save resources for later periods, when her investment may be more effective because of the availability of greater information about attacker preferences (not necessarily from observing actual attacks).
Another important extension to our model would be to distinguish between long-term investment and short-term expenses in defensive resource-allocation decisions. In our current model, any defensive investment in the first period is assumed to evaporate by the second period. However, in reality, the effect of long-term investments is generally cumulative, although it may deteriorate slowly over time. Our model could in principle be extended to treat longterm capital investments differently from short-term expenses, and potentially identify the optimal tradeoff between them.
Overall, we believe that our work provides an important building block for extending past gametheoretic models of optimal defensive resource allocations from simple "toy problems" or "story problems" to more realistic multiattribute attacker objective functions such as those in Beitel et al. (2004) and Rosoff and John (2009) . However, more powerful computational tools are still needed to quantify our model in cases with larger numbers of potential targets.
The PDF of the normalized Weibull distribution can be derived as
The cumulative distribution function (CDF) of the normalized Weibull distribution is given by
The parameters ( ) behave similarly to the two parameters of the beta distribution, except that the normalized Weibull does not have a closed-form mean or variance.
For analytical purposes, we let r = / > 0 and = + > 0 and the PDF and CDF of the normalized Weibull distribution can be written, respectively, as
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Specifically, r represents the relative importance of attribute 1 to attribute 2; e.g., r = 1 implies that the two attributes are equally important. In general, attribute 1 is roughly a factor of r more (or less) important than attribute 2, for r > 1 r < 1 , respectively. Although the variance does not have a closed form, larger values of the spread parameter correspond to lower variances (and therefore lower levels of uncertainty).
Appendix D. Derivation of First-Order Conditions for Example 1
In the example, we assume that A 11 = A 22 = v 1 , and A 12 = A 21 = v 2 . We also assume that the weight on the first attribute x follows a normalized Weibull distribution as described in Appendix C. Note that we adopt the form of normalized Weibull distribution in terms of r and . Larger values of r correspond to larger weight on attribute 1, and larger values of represent lower defender uncertainty.
For simplicity, we denote c as the proportion of the total defensive resource allocated to target 1, instead of the actual amount of resource. We also introduce two functions t c = e − Bc and z t We cannot solve the first-order condition for optimal value t * directly, and therefore cannot get the optimal allocation c * to target 1. To explore the variations in t * with respect to the parameter of defender certainty (with larger corresponding to higher certainty), we use the implicit function theorem. Let f t * = dL t /dt t=t * = 0; we can get Suppose an interior point can be obtained at optimality; the second-order derivative of L t should be positive to gain a local minimum. Therefore, d
2 L/dt 2 t=t * > 0, and the sign of dt * /d will be determined only by the numerator. For any r < e − B A 22 − A 12 / A 11 − e − B A 21 , we have rz < 1 for all t, and there exits¯ such that 1 + r z + 1 − r z ln rz < 0 for all ≥¯ . We also have v 1 t − e − B v 2 /t > 0 for all t because the example assumes e − B v 1 > v 2 . Therefore, dt * /d will be positive for ≥¯ , i.e., the optimal t * increases as increases. In this case, the optimal allocation c * to target 1 will increase as the level of defender uncertainty increases.
Appendix E. Derivation of Attack Probabilities for Example 2
In this example, we assume that the defender has only one known attribute, and the values of the attribute for each target are A 11 = 1 and A 21 = 0. For simplicity, we denote c as the proportion of the total defensive resource allocated to target 1, instead of the actual amount of resource. For a given proportion c of the total resource allocated to target 1, the attack probability on target 1 is given by We let a = e − Bc and b = e − B 1−c , and we introduce two new random variables, U = x/ 1 − x and Z = b 2 − a 1 . Then the attack probability can be simplified as h 1 c = P aU ≥ Z . Because x, 1 , and 2 are independently uniformly distributed on [0 1], it can be obtained that P U ≥ u = 1/ 1 + u for u ≥ 0. In addition, if we assume b > a (the case of b ≤ a yields similar results), the PDF of Z is given by The attack probability on target 1 can then be calculated as follows: INFORMS holds copyright to this article and distributed this copy as a courtesy to the author(s). Additional information, including rights and permission policies, is available at http://journals.informs.org/. 
